Share Repurchase and Ownership Structure by Björck, Erik & Rönegård, Patrik
 Share Repurchase and Ownership Structure 
A quantitative study on Swedish Large Cap firms 
  
by 
Erik Björck and Patrik Rönegård 
 
May 2015 
Master’s Programme in Corporate and Financial Management 
 
 
 
Supervisor:  Maria Gårdängen
I 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
We would like to thank our supervisor Maria Gårdängen for her guidance and valuable 
comments throughout this process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
 
Abstract 
Title:  Share Repurchase and Ownership Structure – A quantitative 
study on Swedish Large Cap firms   
Authors:  Erik Björck and Patrik Rönegård 
Advisor: Maria Gårdängen   
Course:  BUSN 89: Degree Project in Corporate and Financial 
Management – Master Level, 15 University Credit Points (15 
ECTS) 
Seminar date: 2015-06-03 
Key words: Share repurchase, ownership structure, information asymmetry, 
agency theory, investor clientele, signalling, pay-out policy, 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership. 
 
Purpose:  The main purpose of this study is to examine if there is any 
relationship between Swedish companies’ share repurchase 
policies and their ownership structure. The focus will be on 
managerial - and institutional ownership in relation to Swedish 
companies share repurchase policies. In addition several other 
factors, potentially related to share repurchases, will be 
examined.  
Theoretical Framework:  The theoretical framework is built on previous studies and 
theories that covers information asymmetry, agency cost of free 
cash flow, managerial incentives, monitoring and investor 
clientele. Furthermore are previous empirical findings within 
the area presented.     
Empirical Foundation:  The study includes 70 firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Large 
Cap and covers a time period of elven years. 
Methodology:  This study uses a quantitative approach and examines the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
using a linear regression model. 
Conclusion:  Institutional and managerial ownership shows no significant 
relationship to share repurchase. However, institutional 
ownership indicates a positive relationship to share repurchase, 
which can be explained by the tax effect. The book to market 
variable and the market value variable are significantly negative 
related with share repurchase. This relationship is in line with 
this studies expectation as well as with theory.  
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1 Introduction  
  
1.1 Background 
It is of great importance that companies make the right financial decisions in order to be 
competitive and successful. To distribute excess cash to shareholders is part of the financial 
decisions making. There are two ways of distributing cash to the shareholders, either through 
dividend pay-out or by doing a share repurchase. This is commonly referred to as pay-out 
policy (Allen et al. 2002). Researcher argues that the relative importance of share repurchase 
has increased compare to dividends. There is a growing trend of repurchasing shares, 
especially in the US market where the rate of share repurchase has doubled in the last ten 
years (BusinessInsider.com, 2014). Share repurchase is a way to change the capital structure, 
withhold investment flexibility, reduce agency costs and to signal undervaluation. Share 
repurchase can also be more a tax-efficient way to distribute cash to the shareholders relative 
to dividend pay-outs (Allen et al. 2000). The growing trend of share repurchase in the US 
goes back to the early 80´s (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Ogden, et al. 2003). In Sweden this 
trend has been observed as well, although for a much shorter period of time (Råsbrant, 2011). 
This is due to the fact that Swedish listed firms were first allowed to engage in share 
repurchases in March 2000 (Proposition 1999/2000:34). The increased use of share 
repurchase programs is well-known as well as the motives to initiate them. However, there 
are few studies that actually examine the relationship between share repurchases and 
ownership structure.  
1.2 Problem discussion  
In general, most studies regarding pay-out policies examines the price effect of a share 
repurchase announcements and executions. Previous studies that examine the relationship 
between ownership structure, as a firm characteristics, and share repurchases are limited, 
especially on the Swedish market. Jensen (1986) argues that share repurchases can be an 
effective tool in order to reduce agency costs related to monitoring and excess cash. Scattered 
ownership can lead to insufficient monitoring of a company.  
2 
 
In that case, a share repurchase can improve the governance and the monitoring in the sense 
that it changes the ownership composition. Ultimately this leads to greater incentives to 
monitor management if the major shareholders relative voting rights and cash flow right 
increases. Hence, firms with scattered ownership might have greater incentives to use share 
repurchases as a way to mitigate agency costs related to managerial incentives. On the other 
hand, in cases were the ownership is relatively concentrated and the owners, to a large extent, 
consists of institutional investors the tax regulations on capital gains and dividend is 
important when a firm choose to distribute cash to its shareholders. In several countries 
institutional investors face a relative tax advantages on capital gains and might therefore try 
to influence management when they are distributing cash to the shareholders.  
 
Jensen (1986) also argues that share repurchases is a way for management to signal to the 
market that they are willing to distribute excess cash to shareholders instead of spending it on 
non-value creating projects. In order to reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and management and hence reduce agency cost of free cash flow many firms choose to 
compensate management via stocks and or stock options. Li and McNally (2002) studied the 
management ownership of repurchasing firms and finds that management have a larger 
ownership stake in firms that initiate repurchase programmes. Also, the announcement effects 
of the repurchases of these firms tend to be greater. The main argumentation for this finding 
is that management use repurchases to show that they are committed to distribute cash to 
shareholders instead of spending it and non-value creating investments.  
 
The many studies made on share repurchases and the announcement effect finds strong 
support for a positive announcement effect. Among others, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 
and Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000), find that firms that announce share repurchase experience 
an average abnormal return of about 2 % on the announcement day. The theoretical 
explanation of this effect origin from the signalling hypostasis, in which there is information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders. Since there is asymmetric information in 
the market, the announcement of a share repurchase communicates important information 
about current earnings and future investment opportunities. Constantinides and Grundy 
(1989) and McNally (1999) means that the announcement of a share repurchase program may 
signal to the market that management thinks the stock is trading below its intrinsic value.  
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Other researchers like Vermaelen (1981), Stephens et al. (2000) and Grullon and Michaely 
(2002), suggest that capital structure adjustments, distribution of excess cash and substitution 
for cash dividends are other reasons for why firms do share repurchases. 
With this discussion in mind the ownership structure may be an important factor for firms to 
initiate a share repurchase programme. Although ownership structure might be an important 
factor other researchers argue that factors like capital structure, distribution of excess cash 
and substitution for cash dividends are determine factors for the initiation of a share 
repurchase programme. Therefore it is of interest to investigate how share-repurchasing firms 
relates to the factors mentioned above.  
The US market has been able to adopt share repurchase during a longer period of time, thus 
most studies in this subject are performed based on the US market. A research on the 
Swedish market, characterized by a different ownership structure than in US, is therefore of 
interest. In the next section the purpose and the research questions are outlined as well as the 
rationales behind the delimitations of this study.  
1.3 Research Purpose and Research Questions  
The main purpose of this study is to examine if there is any relationship between Swedish 
companies’ share repurchase policies and their ownership structure. The focus of the study is 
on managerial - and institutional ownership in relation to Swedish companies share 
repurchase policies. In addition several other factors, potentially related to share repurchases, 
will be examined.  
 
The following research questions have been set up;  
 Is there any relationship between managerial- and institutional ownership and 
Swedish companies share repurchase policies?  
 Based on traditional finance theories and previous research, what other variables may 
effect a company’s decision to initiate a share repurchase?  
 What could possibly explain a potential relationship? 
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1.4 Delimitations 
This study cover firms listed on the Swedish OMX stock exchange. The rationales for 
choosing firms listed at this exchange are:  
i) Ownership structure – Sweden is a market with relatively concentrated ownership.   
ii) Investor clienteles – The clientele effect assumes that investors are attracted to 
specific company policies, such as pay-out policies.   
iii) Legal system – Sweden is characterized by a modified civil law system where 
strong focus lies on the alignment of interest between institutional owners and 
managers.  
The following criteria’s are used for the selections of companies in the study:  
i) Companies listed on the OMX Large Cap list 1st April 2015  
ii) Companies listed anytime between 2004 to 2014  
The study only include companies that are listed at the Large Cap list. This is mainly due to 
the fact the share repurchase are quite limited among companies listed at the minor lists and 
also because the information is more readily available for Large Cap companies.    
Apart from investigating the relationship between the ownership structure and share 
repurchases the following factors will be examined:  
i) Cash holdings in relation to share repurchase  
ii) Return on asset in relation to share repurchase  
iii) Debt to capital structure in relation to share repurchase 
iv) Dividend yield in relation to share repurchase 
v) Book to market value in relation to share repurchase  
vi) Firm size in relation to share repurchase  
Economic theories and previous studies states that all the above mentioned factors could 
potentially have an influence in the pay-out policy decision making. As mentioned most of 
the studies and theories related to this is based on US market data. Hence, to investigate how 
these factors relate to share repurchases in the Swedish market is of interest, partly because 
Sweden differs from the US market in terms of ownership structure and legal structure and 
partly because this study has not been made on the Swedish market before.   
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1.5 Thesis outline  
The second chapter in the thesis outlines the theoretical framework as well as previous 
studies that this paper is based on. The chapter begins with an introduction to and motives of 
share repurchases. This section is followed by more in depth descriptions of the theories used 
in this thesis. The third chapter describes of the methodology used and involves explanations 
and motivations of the variables included in the regression. This chapter also contains 
explanations of the statistical models used as well as the validity and reliability of this study. 
In chapter four are all statistical tests and the findings of the regression presented. These 
results are then analysed and discussed in the fifth chapter. The last chapter summarize the 
findings and presents the conclusion of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
2 Literature/theoretical review 
The first section of the following chapter presents a brief explanation to what share 
repurchase is and why firms choose to initiate share repurchases. Furthermore, to give the 
reader a good understanding of how a share repurchase can be beneficial for the company, 
several theories and previous studies are presented.  
2.1 Share repurchase 
“When companies with outstanding businesses and comfortable financial positions find their 
shares selling far below intrinsic value in the marketplace, no alternative action can benefit 
shareholders as surely as repurchases.”  
- Warren Buffet 
The paper “Cost of capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of investments” (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1958) outlines theories concerning the ideal capital market; the irrelevance of 
capital structure and that leverage does not affect the value of the firm. Miller and Modigliani 
(1958) define the ideal capital market by five assumptions; Capital markets are frictionless, 
All market participants share homogeneous expectations, All market participants are 
atomistic, The firm’s investment program is fixed and known and The firms financing is fixed. 
It is recognized that these assumptions do not hold in the real world and therefore makes it 
plausible for firms to take advantage of the situations that occur when the assumptions are 
violated.  
There are many reasons for firms to pursue a share repurchase. Ogden et. al. (2003) states six 
effects that are achieved through share repurchase:  
- The asset base of the company will decrease due to the outflow of cash in order to pay 
the repurchase.   
- The equity base will be reduced by the amount of shares being repurchased.  
- The increased demand for the shares will increase the market price of the share. 
- The liquidity of the shares might increase since a new potential buyer has entered the 
market. 
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- The liquidity might decrease due to the reduced number of outstanding shares and 
also because potential sellers know that there is an informed buyer causing the bid-
ask spread to increase. 
 
When combining the violated assumptions of Miller and Modigliani by the potential effects 
of the repurchase mentioned above, three different hypothesis´s arise; Signalling Hypothesis, 
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis and Expropriation Hypothesis, (Ogden et. al. 2003).  
Signalling Hypothesis implies that the management of the firm has superior information 
about the firms “true” value and the future cash flow.  Management will therefore perform a 
share repurchase when they believe that the firm is undervalued in terms of market value. The 
signal is seen as credible hence, the high cost associated with an inaccurate signal makes it 
hard to mimic (Ogden et. al. 2003). Vermaelen (1981) provides evidence of the signalling 
hypothesis where both an abnormal return and improved earnings are confirmed for firms 
announcing a share repurchase. D’Mello and Shroff (2000) examined the relation of share 
repurchase and the undervaluation of the firm. Using earnings-based valuation, they found 
that a majority of the firms that announced a share repurchase was indeed undervalued. 
As opposed to market value signalling Nohel (1998) studied how the operating performance 
impacts of share repurchase. The study showed that improvements in performance were 
rather a result of better asset utilization.  
Expropriation Hypothesis suggests that firms with risky debt outstanding will shift value 
from creditors to shareholders when executing a share repurchase. Creditors will lose value 
due to the decreased debt value caused by a shrunk asset- and equity base (Ogden et. al. 
2003). In opposite, Dann (1981) argues that repurchase not necessarily results in an 
expropriation of wealth. Dann (1981) claims that the positive effect of the firms’ upward 
revaluation, as result of a repurchase, will offset the expropriation for creditors.  
Bartov et al. (1998) identifies three major sources for companies to engage in a share 
repurchase. The first one is the, earlier mentioned, undervaluation of the shares.  The second 
one is related to management’s ownership in the firm.  
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Firms that use stock options or shares, as a part of the compensation program would be 
reluctant to distribute cash to shareholders via dividend pay-outs, since this would affect the 
value of the managers’ ownership negatively.  
Subsequently, managers in these firms have strong incentives to use share repurchase as a 
way to distribute excess cash. The last factor considers the institutional ownership in the firm. 
The reason for this is that institutional investors are facing different taxation on dividend pay-
out than for capital gains. Therefore, firms with large institutional owners are believed to face 
a higher pressure of pursuing a share repurchase as a consequence of tax differences.  
2.2 Agency theory – Principal – Agent problem  
Corporate governance often refers to how companies are controlled and directed. Since the 
ownership and the control of a company often are separated, different problems may arise. 
Some of these problems can be summarized in the agency theory, which refers to the 
relationship between the principals, such as shareholders, and the agents, such as managers, 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  The problem with separation of ownership and control occurs 
because of the information asymmetry between the parties.  The agency theory assumes that 
the agents, who make decisions on behalf of the principals, are better informed than the 
principals and might act in their own best interest rather than in the interest of the principals 
(Ogden et. al. 2003). Since the principals are unable to perfectly monitor the agents, various 
costs associated with the interest conflict will arise. 
2.3 Agency costs of free cash flow 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), agents without any ownership in the company tend 
to use excess cash to invest in projects with negative net present value, NPV, and thus only 
benefit themselves rather than the shareholders. Ogden et. al. (2003) argues that shareholders 
are able to diversify themselves; therefore they are only facing the systematic risk of the 
stock. On the other hand are managers facing the total risk of the firm since their wealth 
depends on the firm to be affluent. Hence, managers have incentives to decrease the risk of 
the firm and act in a way that does not benefit the shareholders. One way for managers to 
lower the risk is to use free cash flow for empire building.  
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This means that management engage in excessive diversification by diversifying the firms’ 
activities into industries outside their main industry, which does not increase the value for the 
shareholders, who are able to diversify themselves.    
 
The difference of interests between the managers and the shareholders means that monitoring 
is needed to control the managers. However, monitoring by outside investors would only 
happen if the shareholders have incentives to do so. Therefore large institutional investors 
plays an important role in the monitoring process since there incentives to monitor are greater 
than for minority investors (Weiss and Beckerman 1995).  
2.4 Ownership concentration – Institutional investors   
Concentrated ownership is seen as an important monitoring mechanism. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) argues that a higher concentrated ownership will lead to better monitoring since large 
stakeholders are more tied to the company than minority investors. Large stakeholders have 
more cash flow rights as well as more voting rights in the company, which gives them a 
greater incentive to monitor compare to scattered owners.  
 
Allen et al. (2000) means that institutional owners are in a better position to access 
information about the firm and its performance. Hence, their ability to control managers in a 
beneficial way is higher compare to scattered owners. A too dispersed ownership can lead to 
insufficient monitoring, which increase the information asymmetry and ultimately the agency 
costs. Since it is hard for scattered owners to collectively monitor managers a free-rider 
problem will occur. Firms with too dispersed ownership can therefore use pay-out policies 
such as dividend pay-outs and share repurchase to reduce this problem. (Jensen, 1986) 
2.5 Tax clientele and share repurchase vs. dividends 
There are several theories that try to explain why some firms prefer dividend pay-outs rather 
than share repurchase. Allen et al. (2000) developed a theoretical model to address this 
question. The model is based on two main assumptions; (1) there are only two types of 
investors, taxed individuals and institutions that are untaxed.  
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The second assumption is that institutional investors have a greater tendency and incentive to 
become informed about the performance of the firm than taxed individuals. Under these 
assumptions a firm can attract institutional investors by paying dividends. The logic behind 
this argument is that the equilibrium price will be lower for dividend paying stock compare to 
non-dividend paying stocks because of individual taxation on dividends. 
Ultimately it leads to that good firms pay dividend while bad firms do not pay dividend to 
avoid the monitoring from institutional investors.  
However, more recent studies indicate that companies choose share repurchase in favour of 
dividends. Ross et al (2005) argues that institutional investors prefer share repurchase rather 
than dividend. This is mainly due to tax reasons. On average is capital gain taxed at a lower 
rate than dividend in most European countries (Carroll et al. 2012). In Sweden on the other 
hand, capital gains and dividend are taxed the same level. However, institutions are exempt 
from taxation on capital gains (39 kap. 14§ IL). In USA, institutional investors pay ordinary 
income tax on dividend pay-outs whereas a selling of a stock is taxed as a capital gain. 
Furthermore can capital gains be deferred, while the dividend pay-outs are non-deferrable. 
Hence, institutional investors that want to maximize their after-tax capital gain may prefer 
share repurchase to dividend pay-out. Therefore the same argument about good firms and bad 
firms can be made when it comes to share repurchase.  
2.6 Management ownership 
As mentioned, the separation of ownership and control may lead to a conflict of interest 
between shareholders and management. Thus, incur costs of monitoring. In order to align the 
interest of owners and managers, compensation programmes, including stocks and stock 
options, can be used (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, the larger the management 
ownership in the firm is, in terms of stock holding and stock options, the more motivated the 
managers are to pursue profitable projects, avoid empire building and maximize the value of 
the firm (Ali et al. 2007).  
 
To what extent the agency costs are reduced by pay-out policies is examined by Fenn and 
Liang (2000), who studied the impact of pay-out policy as a function of managerial 
ownership.  
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They claim that the alignment of interest between managers and shareholders can be 
improved by pay-out policies. However, they are arguing that managers are less likely to use 
dividend pay-outs, as part of shareholder compensation, when having own ownership in the 
firm. The reason for this is that managerial stock holdings and stock options are strongly 
negative affected by a dividend pay-out. Since share repurchase does not affect the price of 
the share negatively and might even put an upward pressure on the share price. This way of 
distributing cash is therefore more preferable from a managerial point of view.  
Fenn and Liang (2000) state that there is a positive relation between managerial ownership 
and share repurchase. The study further confirms that share repurchase is commonly used as 
a complement or even substitute to dividend pay-outs.  
2.7 Share repurchase as a way of signalling  
The information asymmetry between managers and the market can impose difficulties for the 
firm to communicate information that should have been reflected in the market price of the 
firm. In order to bridge this informational gap the firm can use “signals” that the market are 
able to respond to. Depending on how credible these signals are the more will the market 
adjust towards the true value. The credibility is basically referred to as how hard the signal is 
to mimic, thus the cost of making a false signal (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). Miller and 
Rock (1985) are arguing that managers that are expecting a higher future cash flow also are 
more willing to engage in shareholder compensation, either as dividend or a share repurchase. 
In contrast, Grullon (2000) stating that a significant part of the repurchasing firms have 
declining earnings. As a result of that, Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) concludes that 
repurchasing firms rather suffers from decreasing profitability but at the same time they 
establish that firms, especially in mature industries, use share repurchase as a way of 
shrinking the firms asset base. Which in some ways is a necessary value creating strategy. 
 
The same way management can offset some off the information asymmetry concerning future 
cash flows by signalling, the same way they can try to influence the firms’ intrinsic value, if 
this is not corresponding with managements view (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). Ikenberry et 
al. (1995) studied the excess abnormal return for 1200 repurchases on the market. Their study 
confirmed the theory of firms conducting share repurchases being undervalued at the time for 
the repurchase. 
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Ikenberry et al. (1995) also examines to what extent the share repurchase can explain an 
undervaluation by using a book to market ratio as a proxy for the miss-valuation. Common 
for both studies is that they imply that managers’ seems to use repurchase when they believe 
that the stock is undervalued.  
Furthermore, the studies indicates that the market is underreacting to the signals that a 
repurchase would imply, thus the abnormal returns does not fully correspond with the 
measured undervaluation (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000).             
2.8 Optimal Leverage via Agency Theory 
According to Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) there are various ways agency costs can 
be mitigated. Excess cash can for example be reduced by increasing the level of debt or by 
changing the pay-out policy. Ogden et. al. (2003) discusses two different effects of debt with 
respect to optimal leverage. One effect is the negative influence of agency cost of debt. The 
agency cost of debt arises because lenders have different motives compare to managers and 
shareholders. For example, the managers, who are supposed to act in the interest of the 
shareholders, take on a risky project to benefit the shareholders and increase the value of the 
firm. The lenders on the other hand are typically interested in less risky investments. By 
engage in risky projects, managers can reduce the value of the lenders claim on the firms’ 
asset. This is called expropriations of creditors’ wealth by shareholders. Ultimately, the more 
risky projects, financed by debt, the more expensive will the debt be (Ogden et. al. 2003).  
 
According to Ogden et. al. (2003) debt has a disciplinary effect on management. With debt 
financing, the firm has to use some of the cash generated from the operations to pay creditors.  
The free cash flow will then be reduced as well as management’s ability for empire building. 
Hence, an increased level of debt can enhance shareholder level. Jung et al. (1996) argues 
that, based on these two debt-effects, there is an optimal capital structure for each firm. The 
agency costs associated with managerial discretion is a decreasing function of leverage while 
the agency costs of debt is an increasing function of debt. The optimal capital structure is 
when these two effects are offsetting each other. Ultimately an increase in debt can help 
mitigating the agency costs associated with the principal - agent problem.  
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2.9 Distribution of excess cash  
To mitigate the agency cost of free cash flow firms can distribute the excess cash via a 
dividend pay-out or a share repurchase (Jensen 1986). When comparing dividend pay-outs to 
share repurchase the latter can be seen as the less costly alternative to the firm. Brav et al. 
(2003) state that managers try to avoid cutting dividends. In his survey he find that over 94 % 
of the managers trying to avoid dividend cuts and over 65 % of the managers would rise 
external funds before cutting dividends. Denis et al. (1994) explain this by the fact that 
dividend cuts are costly for the firm in the sense that the market has a strong negative 
reaction to dividend cuts.  
Previous studies that have examined the relation between excess cash and share repurchase 
find evidence that are consistent with the agency theory. For example, Lie (2000) finds that 
there is a significant correlation between share repurchase and excess cash, firms that initiate 
share repurchase programs have higher levels of cash compared to non-repurchasing firms.  
 
2.10 Corporate governance and the ownership role  
The Swedish governance system differs in some areas compare to the one-tier and two-tier 
Anglo-Saxon system. The differences is mainly concerning attitudes towards the role of 
owners, responsibilities between different governance organs and the division of power. 
Angblad et. al. (2001) found that the corporate governance system in Sweden has a strong 
focus to align the interest between managers and institutional owners. The framework in the 
Swedish governance system allows for strong ownership powers, which is further enhanced 
by the fact that dual-class shares are used. This allows for long-term institutional investors to 
exercise their power to a larger extent. The governance system and the use of dual-class 
shares has some drawback in terms of protection of minority rights. In order to balance the 
ownership powers of institutional investors a new “Swedish companies act” was introduced 
in 2006 (Swedish Corporate Governance Board). The act consists of various legal obligations 
in order to protect minority investors. Apart from the “Swedish companies act” the Swedish 
stock market is seen as very transparent and has high social pressure which preventing high 
power owners to exploit minority shareholders (Barca & Becht 2001). Sweden is also 
characterized by a relatively concentrated ownership structure. This is seen as an important 
part in the Swedish governance system.  
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The owners of Swedish listed firms are usually dominated by a few major shareholders. Such 
shareholders are generally expected to take responsibility for the company they invest in by 
having long-term investment horizons. Compare to the Swedish stock market, the stock 
market in UK and US are generally characterized by a much more dispersed ownership 
structure (Lekvall, 2009).  
2.11 Summery of Previous Findings 
Table one presents empirical studies that examine the relationship between share repurchase 
and the factors that are investigated in this study.  Most of these studies look at share 
repurchase from an agency theory perspective and explain share repurchase using this theory 
as a framework. However, the tax-effect is also something that plays and important role in the 
decision-making regarding pay-out policies. The ownership structure in relation to share 
repurchases is in most cases explained by the fact that institutional investors as well as 
managers have strong economic incentives to distribute excess-cash via share repurchases. 
Other factors that are connected to share repurchase usually find support in signalling and 
information asymmetry models. 
 
 
Table 1. Previous findings. 
Authors Area of study 
Studied 
Period 
Country Main Findings 
Houcine, R 
(2013). 
Share repurchase 
and ownership 
structure  
2004-2008 France 
Houcine finds that institutional investors 
affect firms repurchasing policies positively 
due to the fact that institutional investors 
have the ability influence managers to pay 
excess cash via share repurchase. 
Furthermore, he find a positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and share 
repurchase, which is explained by the fact 
that managers can increase their relative 
ownership in the firm when pursuing a share 
repurchase.  
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Some criticism can be directed to the pervious findings mentioned above.  One source of 
criticism that can be directed to studies that investigate the relationship between the valuation 
of the firm and share repurchase is that these studies are using earnings-based valuation 
models.  
Fenn and 
Liang 
(2000) 
Pay-out policy 
and managerial 
ownership 
1993-1997 USA 
Fenn and Liang find that firms that use 
stocks and stock options as a way to 
compensate management are reluctant to use 
dividend as a way to distribute cash to 
shareholders. This is because managerial 
stock holdings and stock options are strongly 
negative affected by a dividend pay-out. 
Furthermore, they found a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership 
and share repurchase.  
Ross et al. 
and  
 
Pay-out policies 
and institutional 
ownership 
2005-2010 USA 
The use of share repurchase has increased. 
One possible reason for this is that 
institutional investors prefer share 
repurchase rather than dividend. This is 
mainly due to tax reasons. On average is 
capital gain taxed at a lower rate than 
dividend.  
Grullon and 
Ikenberry 
(2000) 
Share repurchase 
and value creation 
1980-1999 USA 
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) find that firms 
use share repurchase as a way of shrinking 
the firms asset base. Which in some ways is 
a necessary value creating strategy. 
Lie (2000) 
Share repurchase 
and excess cash  
1978-1993 USA 
Lie (2000) finds that there is a significant 
positive correlation between share 
repurchase and excess cash, firms that 
initiate share repurchase programs have 
higher levels of cash compared to non-
repurchasing firms. 
D’Mello 
and Shroff 
Share repurchase 
in relation to 
undervaluation 
1970-1989 USA 
Their findings support the theory that share 
repurchase can be used to signal 
undervaluation. By using earnings-based 
valuation models they found that the 
majority of the firms that announced share 
repurchases was indeed undervalued  
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It is hard to determine how accurate these earnings-based valuations models are and by using 
this type of valuations model one give room for further errors, which could cause biased 
estimations.  Another problem related to this is that different studies use different metrics to 
measure the undervaluation. This could potentially cause contradictory estimates. The fact 
that some studies also cover a long period of time could be a problem. For example, 
information disclosure and auditing principals’ might change over a time, which can lead to 
measurement errors.  
Some studies use alternative measures for share repurchases compare to the ratio-based 
measurement that this study uses.  For example, Houcine (2013) measures the net repurchase 
in absolute numbers. By doing so he does not account for the fact the different companies 
have different amount of share outstanding, which could ultimately lead to biased estimates.  
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3 Methodology 
In this section the methodology of the thesis will be discussed. Firstly, the nature of the thesis 
will be presented followed by the sample selection and data collection. The last part of this 
section will be a presentation of the different steps that has been taken in order to come up 
with a reliable result.  
3.1 Research Approach 
The data set in this study consists of eleven years of historical numerical data from the 
Swedish Large Cap index. Hence, it is natural to apply a quantitative approach in order to 
answer the research question. The quantitative research approach is a research approach 
where the quantification of the data and analysis is central. Compare to the qualitative 
research the process of measurement is important in a quantitative study (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). The result in a quantitative study can often be seen as the truth with some limitation to 
the data sample. The measurement of the numerical data provides a good fundamental 
connection between the data and the analysis in the thesis. Hence, the most applicable 
approach to use in this study is a quantitative one.  
 
In addition to a quantitative approach, this study will also take on a deductive approach. The 
deductive approach starts with the theory and goes on with analysing the data based on 
existing theories and previous studies. The idea of a deductive approach is to analyse the data 
and draw conclusions that will either weaken or strengthen the theory. Compared to the 
inductive approach, the deductive approach has some drawbacks. The first drawback is that 
new theories or findings can be published before the researcher’s findings are published.  The 
second drawback is that the data used in the study may be irrelevant to the theory. This will 
only be apparent when the data is collected and the theory is applied.  
The last drawback is that the data might not be suitable for the purpose of the research 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). The drawbacks could potentially cause problems during the thesis 
process. Therefore, the following comments should be taken in to consideration. (1) 
Considering the time period of which this thesis is conducted, it is unlikely that any new 
findings or theories will affect the conclusions. (2) The data collection is made after studying 
various theories related to the research subject.  
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(3) The independent variables in the thesis are chosen carefully in order to fulfil the purpose 
of the thesis. A more in depth explanation of each variable will follow later on in this chapter. 
3.2 Data 
The data in this study is mainly collected from three different sources, NASDAQ OMX 
webpage, Datastream and Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ. The amount of shares that has been 
repurchased and sold has been collected from NASDAQ OMX webpage. The independent 
variables used in this study have been gathered from Datastream and Standard & Poor’s 
Capital IQ. Debt, Market Value, Dividend Yield, Cash Holdings, Assets Value and Market 
Value have been sourced from Datastream. Management Ownership, Institutional Ownership 
and Return on Asset have been sourced from Capital IQ. In a few cases were data was not 
available on either of the data sources annual reports was used as a complement. The values 
for all the independent variables are sourced as per the opening values for the execution year 
of potential share repurchases. For example, the Return on Asset (ROA) closing value for 
2005 are compared to share repurchases made in year 2006. In some cases the collected data 
has been used to calculate the independent variables, for example cash and total assets have 
been used to calculate the cash to total asset ratio. The collected data covers companies that 
are listed on Stockholm NASDAQ OMX Large Cap as of first of April 2015. Companies that 
have been listed less than one year prior 1
st
 of April 2015 are excluded from the sample due 
to limitations of data available. The total sample consists of 72 companies but in accordance 
with the data limitations is two companies excluded leaving 70 companies within the sample. 
By using this selection approach, where data is systematically removed and not randomly 
chosen, may result in inaccurate results due to that selection bias that occur. The time period 
for collected data ranges from the 1
st
 of January 2004 to 31
st
 of December 2014. For those 
companies that were listed later than 2004 the listing date is used as the first date for data 
collection. Companies that have been removed from the Large Cap, due to bankruptcy, 
delisting etc., during the chosen time period are not reflected in the study. That causes a 
survival bias that further can affect the results of the study. Considering a perfect data sample 
with no missing values, the sample would consist of 803 observations. After adjusting for 
listings done at the Stockholm NASDAQ OMX Large Cap list under 2014 and for companies 
listed later than 2004 the sample consists of 70 companies and 721 observations.  
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Hence, there are 78 missing observations. The companies that are included in and excluded 
from the sample are stated in appendix, exhibit 9 and 10, respectively.   
3.3 Regression Model  
In this research both time series and cross sectional data is used. The data consists of multiple 
firms obtained over multiple time periods. Hence, a panel data approach is most applicable in 
this study.  
3.3.1 Panel data 
The data used in this study contains both cross sectional and time series data and is treated as 
panel data. The cross sectional data represents the companies included in the sample and the 
time series represents a maximum of eleven years. Since there are missing values in the time 
dimension the data is of unbalanced character. Panel data is preferable thus it provides more 
reliable results than a pooled data, through increased number of degrees of freedom and as far 
as it is possible mitigates the problem with multicollinearity. Furthermore, the panel data 
gives the advantage to control for fixed and random effects caused by omitted variables. 
Panel data is expressed by the following equation 
Equation 1:  𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the dependent variable, 𝛼 represents the intercept of the equation and 𝛽 
is the coefficient of the independent variable 𝑥. (Brooks, 2008) 
Diagnostic tests are performed in accordance with the assumptions of the classic linear 
regression model before conducting the regression. (Brooks 2008) The results of these tests 
will be presented in chapter four.  
3.3.2 Pooled model 
In a pooled regression, all data, both cross sectional and time series data would be pooled into 
one column of data and expressed in one single equation. A pooled regression is estimated by 
a regular Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. Using a pooled regression is the easiest 
way of dealing with panel data, however it involves some limitations.  
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The pooled regression assumes the average of all variables and the relationship between them 
to be constant over time and within the cross sections.  
Furthermore, the pooled regression does not account for correlation between the error term, 
𝑢𝑖𝑡, and the independent variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑡, causing heterogeneity in the data. Hence, the 
regression can lead to severe biased estimates. (Brooks, 2008) 
3.3.3 Fixed effects model  
Due to the limitations of the pooled regression and the risk of getting biased estimates the 
fixed effect model and random effect model is used in order to deal with these limitations. 
The fixed effect model decomposes the disturbance term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, into a unit specific effect, 𝜇𝑖, 
and a reminder disturbance, 𝜈𝑖𝑡. The reminder disturbance varies over time and between the 
cross sectional unit and captures everything that is unexplained about the dependent variable, 
𝑦𝑖𝑡. 
Equation 2:  𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
                                                          𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
In accordance to above notation will the fixed effect model make it possible for the intercepts 
to vary over the cross sections but not over time and at the same time keep both the cross 
sectional and time coefficients fixed. Hence, the fixed effect model will only control for 
variables that change cross sectional and that does not differ over time. (Brooks, 2008) 
When the regression is performed with fixed effects in both the cross sectional and the time 
dimension it enables to test for heterogeneity within the data through a redundant fixed effect 
test. The redundant test measures the significance of heterogeneity and provides probability 
values, in terms F-stat and Chi-square, of rejecting the null-hypothesis of homogeneity. If the 
F-stat and Chi-square shows probability values that enables to reject the null-hypothesis for 
both cross-section and for period that means that there is heterogeneity in both dimensions 
that has to be accounted for in the data. (Brooks, 2008) 
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H 0 is true H 1  is true
Random Effect Efficient 
Consistent Inconsistent
Fixed Effect Inefficient 
Consistent Consistent
3.3.4 Random effects model  
In addition to the fixed effect model there is a random effects model. Both the random and 
the fixed effect model purpose that there are different intercepts for each entity in the 
regression and that these intercepts are fixed over time and the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables are assumed to be the same, both in period and cross-
section. The random effect model is shown below.  
 
Equation 3:  𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 +   𝜔𝑖𝑡 ,   𝜔𝑖𝑡 =  𝜖𝑖 +  𝜐𝑖𝑡 
 
The difference between the random and fixed effect model is that, in the random effect 
model the intercepts for each cross sectional unit is assumed to be the same both in the time 
dimension and the cross sectional dimension. In this model, an error term that varies cross 
sectional but not over time is also added. In order to generate efficient estimates a 
generalized least square procedure is used. Meaning that you demean all the variables with 
the weighted mean of y and x over time. By doing this one can ensure that there are no 
cross-correlations in the error term. Generally, since there are less parameters to be 
estimated in the random effects model this model saves degrees of freedom and is therefore 
more efficient than the fixed effects model. However, the random effect model is 
inconsistent if the null-hypothesis does not hold in contrast to the fixed effect model, which 
is independently consistent of the hypothesis. (Brooks, 2008)  
 
Table 2. Efficiency and Consistency  
 
 
 
 
 
As presented earlier, a redundant test, using fixed effect in both dimensions, is performed to 
see if there are any signs of heterogeneity in the regression. If the redundant test indicates 
that there is heterogeneity in any of the dimensions, a random- or a fixed effects model 
should be used in order to correct for the heterogeneity. To see if the random effect model is 
well specified a Hausman test is performed.  
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Since it is not possible to test for random effects in both dimensions simultaneously the 
Hausman test is performed two times; one of the tests is performed using random effect is 
the time dimension and one of the tests is performed using random effects in the cross-
section dimension. If the null-hypothesis is rejected in either of the tests, one rejects the fact 
that random effects are well specified and fixed effects should be used instead. However, it 
is not optimal to do the effects-testing in each dimension separately. Therefore, one have to 
demean one of the dimension manually and then run the Hausman test using random effects 
in the other dimension. By doing so one can run the Hausman test for random effects in both 
dimensions simultaneously and hence yield a more reliable result. The result of the tests will 
be presented in the result chapter.  
3.4 Variables  
The two variables that this study will focus on are the percentage of managerial ownership 
and the percentage of institutional ownership in relation to share repurchase. The other 
variables of interest have been selected based on theoretical preferences and previous 
findings concerning the initiation of a share repurchase program. The variables will be 
described in the following section of this chapter. The regression equation that is used in the 
study is stated below: 
Equation 4: 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡  =
     𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   
3.4.1 Dependent variable 
As stated in the theory chapter there are many different reasons to why a firm buy back own 
shares. In order to capture the true amount of the repurchased shares the net repurchase is 
measured.  
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The net repurchase is measured as the number of repurchased stock during the year less the 
sold shares. Since the number of outstanding share differs between companies, a repurchase 
ratio will provide a more fair value than, for example, the actual number of repurchased 
shares. Hence, the number of repurchased shares is measured as a ratio of the total shares 
outstanding (net repurchase/total share outstanding). 
3.4.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables have been chosen based on theories and represent some of the 
most influential factors to initiate a share repurchase. The variables are selected in order to 
best explain market frictions such as agency cost, information asymmetry, investor clientele 
and optimal capital structure. In order to bring clarity to the results null-hypothesis are set up 
for all independent variables. These are stated below.  
 
Institutional Ownership 
 
Institutional investors play an important role in monitoring the firm and have the ability to 
exercise control over a firms activities depending on the concentration of the ownership, 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). According to this, it is of interest to examine how the amount of 
institutional ownership is affecting a firm’s decision to repurchase shares. Some studies 
indicate a positive relationship between these share repurchase and institutional ownership, 
which is explained by the favourable taxation of capital gain relative to dividend pay-out 
(Bartov et. al. 1998) (Ross et al. 2005). On the other hand is Jensen (1986) arguing that a high 
degree of institutional ownership leads to better monitoring and less information asymmetry, 
which implies less need of share repurchase as a way of bridge the information gap. 
Institutional ownership is expressed as the percentage of all shares held by institutions and is 
defined in accordance with the definitions stated by U.S Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
H0: The degree of institutional ownership does not have any significant effect on the amount 
of shares repurchased. 
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Managerial Ownership 
The agency theory states that economic incentives are used to mitigate costs associated with 
managers not handling in the interest of shareholders (Shliefer and Vishny, 1997). Previous 
research by Fenn and Liang (2000) argue that management incentives to buy back shares 
increase with the amount of shares owned by management due to the effect of an upward 
pressure on the share price. According to the agency theory and previous research it can 
intuitively be argued that managerial ownership has a significant impact on the amount of 
shares repurchased. The managerial ownership is measured as the percentage of shares 
outstanding owned by managers and executives in the firm.  
H0: The degree of managerial ownership does not have any significant effect on the amount 
of shares repurchased. 
 
Cash holding 
 
In accordance to the agency theory (Easterbrook 1984 & Jensen 1986) the agency cost of free 
cash flow is something that a firm can reduce by distributing excess cash to the shareholders. 
Several previous studies indicate that there is a correlation between cash holdings and share 
repurchase. Lie (2000) finds that cash holdings are positively correlated with share 
repurchase. Considering that the Swedish market is different in terms of ownership structure 
and, hence monitoring, this would mean that the cash holding variable could be less 
influential than previous studies show, which motivates the choice of including cash holdings 
in the regression model. The cash holding variable represents the firms’ cash and cash 
equivalents as a percentage of the firms’ size in terms of total assets. According to previous 
research, cash holdings and share repurchase is expected to positively correlate with each 
other. This is due to the fact that share repurchase can reduce the agency cost of free cash 
flow (Easterbrook, 1984 & Jensen, 1986).  
H0: The degree of cash holdings does not have any significant effect on the amount of shares 
repurchased. 
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ROA 
 
According to the Cash Flow Hypothesises, share repurchase can be used with the intention to 
reduce information asymmetry of increased future cash flows, and thereby impact the market 
value positive. Grullon (2000) argues for the use of share repurchase as a strategy for firms to 
increase their profitability on assets. Thus, firms that have conducted a share repurchase 
indicate signs of higher ROA. ROA is used in order to measure the firms’ profitability and is 
expressed as Net Income divided by total assets. ROA is used as a proxy for the firms’ 
profitability and is included as an independent variable in order to test the effect of 
management signalling theory (Barkov et al. 1998).  
H0: ROA does not have any significant effect on the amount of shares repurchased. 
 
Debt to Capital 
 
According to Jung et al. (1996) each firm has an optimal capital structure. Share repurchase 
can be used as a tool to tune the capital structure of the firm. Since a share repurchase leads to 
an increase in leverage of the firm without changing the market value of capital.  
Therefore it can be argued that firms with low debt to capital ratio use share repurchase as a 
way to increase their leverage. The debt to capital variable is calculated as the total value of 
interest bearing debt divided by the total capital.  
H0: The amount of debt does not have any significant effect on the amount of shares 
repurchased. 
 
Dividend yield 
  
Many studies, among them Ross et al. (2005), presents evidence of an increase in share 
repurchase while dividend payments have decreased. Hence, share repurchase can be seen as 
a substitute to dividends. The management flexibility and tax effects play an important role in 
this trend. Allen et. al. (2000) argues that marginal tax difference on capital gains will affect 
corporate decisions based on the stakeholders’ preferences. The reason why this variable is 
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interesting to look at is because a lot of the Swedish Large Cap companies have institutional 
owners in both US and Europe where tax on dividend payments are higher than on capital 
gain. Furthermore, Swedish institutions are not subject to taxation on capital gains. Because 
of capital gain tax advantage and because share repurchase can be seen as a substitute to 
dividend payments this variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the dependent 
variable. The dividend variable is simply the dividend yield.  
H0: The dividend yield does not have any significant effect on the amount of shares 
repurchased. 
 
Book to market  
 
The ratio works as a proxy in order to identify any potential under- overvaluation of the firm 
and captures the effect of signalling hypothesis. Previous studies show sign of undervaluation 
as a factor for initiate a share repurchase (Ikenberry et. al. 1995) (Bartov et al. 1998). Book to 
market measures the firms’ book value of equity in relation to its market capitalization. 
H0: The book to market ratio does not have any significant effect on the amount of shares 
repurchased. 
 
Market Value 
 
Gryglewicz (2004) argues that the size of the firm determines the company’s share 
repurchase policy. Where smaller firms, which are assumed to have higher information 
asymmetry than large firms, tend to repurchase shares to a higher extent in order to reduce 
the information asymmetry. Allen et al. (2002) further states that dividend pay-out should be 
avoided by firms with high degrees of information asymmetry. Which could imply of a 
negative relationship between share repurchase and dividend pay-out. Market value is used as 
a proxy for firm size and is measured as the consolidated value of all common shares 
outstanding.  
H0: The market value does not have any significant effect on the amount of shares 
repurchased. 
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3.5 Descriptive statistic 
To get an overview of the data a descriptive statistic test is performed. Statistics such as, 
mean, skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are presented in the result chapter. According to 
the Jarque-Bera test, is the data assumed to be normally distributed if the probability value 
takes on a value higher than 0.05 (at a 5% significance level). However, the non-normality is 
considered not an issue as long as the sample is sufficiently large (Brooks 2008). A 
sufficiently large sample is not exactly specified but some argues that if the number of 
observations is above 30 the non-normality is not an issue. If the descriptive test also 
indicated extreme kurtosis or skewness, meaning “flat tails” is observed, logged values can 
be used to deal with this problem.  
3.5.1 Multicollinearity  
In order to produce a reliable result using OLS estimation the assumption of non- 
multicollinearity must hold. This means that there must be no relationship between the 
independent variables.  
If the independent variables are correlated with each other it could cause biased estimates. 
Generally, there will be some correlation between the variables that does not cause any sever 
problem to the estimates.  
However, if the correlation is too high the, i.e. larger than 0.8, the precision in the variables 
will be affected (Brooks 2008). In the result chapter the result of the correlation matrix is 
presented. 
3.5.2 Linearity or non-linearity  
To test whether a linear or a non-linear regression model is appropriate to use a RESET test is 
performed. The RESET test indicates if a straight line could explain the relationship between 
the dependent variable and the independent variable(s) or not. If it is not possible to reject the 
null-hypothesis there is no apparent non-linearity. To deal with a potential non-linearity 
problem one can use logged values. The result of the RESET test is presented in the result 
chapter.  
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3.5.3 Heteroscedasticity 
According to the second assumption in OLS model, the variance of the error terms has to be 
constant. If there is sign of heteroscadacity then the estimate of the regression can be biased. 
In order to control for heteroscadacity a White test is performed. If the null-hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity cannot be rejected one have to control for heteroscadacity. The result of the 
White test is presented in the result chapter.  
3.5.4 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation implies that the correlation between the error terms, in both the cross 
sectional and period dimension, is non-excitant. Autocorrelation can lead to that wrong 
interpretation whether or not the independent variable is affecting the dependent variable. 
Thus, leading to higher probability of type I and II error. In order to test that the assumption 
is not violated a Durbin-Watson test can be performed. A value of the Durbin-Watson test 
close to 0 and 4 indicates positive and negative autocorrelation, respectively. To be able to 
conclude no evidence of autocorrelation the stats of Durbin-Watson should indicate a value 
within the critical range of 1.57 – 2.43. (Brooks, 2008) 
3.5.5 Testing for endogeneity   
To be able to produce unbiased estimates in a regression the assumption of non-stochastic 
estimates mush hold. If this assumption holds the variable is considered to be an exogenous 
variable. Meaning that the variable is statistically independent of the stochastic error terms in 
the model. In cases where this assumption does not hold the variable is an endogenous 
variable, i.e. correlated with the stochastic error term. This is caused by unobserved elements 
hidden in the error term. Endogeneity can also be caused by reversed causality which refers 
to when the independent variable is affected by the dependent variable. The endogeneity 
problem can lead to wrong interpretation of the variables, i.e. rejecting a hypothesis that is in 
fact true, type I error, or fail to reject a hypothesis that is in fact false, type II error. (Brooks, 
2008). 
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Based on the theory and the relationship between the variables one can suspect that there 
might be endogenous variables within the data. Intuitively one can argue for that there might 
be an endogeneity problem caused by the variables that are directly affected by changes in 
asset base and book value of equity. Hence, “Cash to Assets”, “Book to Market”, Market 
Value and “ROA” can be variables causing reversed causality. To check whether or not 
“Cash to Assets”, “Book to Market”, Market Value and “ROA” is endogenous a Hausman 
test is performed using an instrumental variable (IV). In order to be a valid IV, the IV has to 
fulfil two requirements (Brooks, 2008):  
1) The IV has to be relevant – e.g IV must be correlated with the endogenous variable. 
2) The IV must be exogenous – e.g IV must be uncorrelated with the error term. 
 
To test for the endogeneity problem, for the variables that intuitively could be argued as 
exogenous “Cash to Assets”, “Book to Market”, Market Value and “ROA”, a variable 
measuring the total asset value is introduced. By running a regression with the potential 
endogeneous variables as dependent variable and include one new variable “asset value” as 
an independent variable it is possible to determine if “asset value” is fulfilling the 
requirements as IV. If the IV is significant it is valid since it is relevant and therefore 
corresponds to the first assumption. It is not possible to test the second requirement since the 
error term is unobserved. Instead of test the second requirement one can look at the 
correlation matrix; if the correlation between the IV and the dependent variable is zero or 
close to zero the second requirement is assumed to the fulfilled. To make sure that the IV 
model works it has to be identified or over identified.  
Meaning that the number of IVs has to be at least equal to the number of endogenous 
variables. (Brooks, 2008) Since the potential endogenous variables are tested one by one, 
this model is identified since number of IVs is equal to the number of endogenous variables. 
The results of the steps described above will be presented in the result-chapter.  
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3.6 Reliability and Validity  
The overall method selection follows previous studies performed within the subject and is 
therefore to be considered as an approved way of addressing the research question, Houcine 
(2013), Skjeltorp & Ødegaard (2004). The data used in the regression is collected from 
reliable sources and the sample is check by comparing to company specific annual reports in 
order to ensure credibility. All statistical tests and the choice of regression model follow 
Brooks (2008) and are widely used in comparable studies. Theories used as fundamental 
framework in this study is based on foreign data, which could imply that these are not 
applicable for the market this study examines. Tax is an explanatory variable that is essential 
in previous studies, however some of the institutional investors might face different tax 
regulations. This study does not take the geographical location of the institutional investors 
in to account, hence it could be hard to make any general assumptions regarding the tax 
effect. The variables in the study are selected based on theories concerning share repurchase 
and previous studies which have investigated the relevance and significance of these (Miller 
& Rock, 1985) (Ikenberry et al. 1995). The managerial ownership is capturing the direct 
ownership in terms of common shares owned by managers and executives and does not 
cover other incentives that are dependent on the share. This makes the managerial ownership 
most likely downward biased in the regression and can cause misinterpretations. 
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4 Results  
Firstly in this chapter the result of all diagnostic tests will be presented. Secondly the 
empirical findings from the regression is presented. An in depth discussion of the finding will 
be held in chapter 5 analysis.  
4.1 Diagnostic tests  
 
Normality test 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics. 
According to exhibit one, in appendix, most of the variables suffer from non-normal 
distribution. In order to increase the significance of normal distribution following variables 
are logged; Repurchase Amount, Management Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Debt to 
Capital, Cash to Assets and Book to Market. The logged values, in the above table, are 
showing improved values for all normality measures in comparison to exhibit one. As can be 
seen in the table above the variables are skewed, and indicate asymmetry from normal 
distribution. Furthermore are the descriptive statistics showing significant kurtosis values, 
which indicates flat tails in all of the variables. The probability of Jarque-Bera specifies that 
the null-hypothesis of normal distribution is rejected on a 1 % level for all of the variables 
except “Institutional Ownership” and “Dividend Yield”. Hence, it is just “Institutional 
Ownership” and “Dividend Yield” that is significantly normally distributed.  
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Value df Probability
t-statistic 0.550053 711 0.5825
F-statistic 0.302558 (1. 711) 0.5825
Likelihood ratio 0.306748 1 0.5797
Considering the large sample of 721 observations the non-normality for the majority of the 
variables is not considered an issue in this study.   
Multicollinearity 
The problem of multicollinearity occurs when some of the independent variables have a 
correlation above -+ 0.8. As can be seen in the table below the highest (lowest) correlation is 
the correlation between book to market and debt to capital. The correlation between these 
variables is -0.446. Hence, no mutlicollinearity problem exists in the data set.  
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix. 
 
Linearity or non-linearity  
The result from the RESET test is presented below. After logging some of the variables used 
in this study one can conclude that a linear relationship is appropriate. The F-statistic does not 
exceed the critical value and the probability is a 0.482 it can be concluded that a linear model 
is appropriate to use in this study. The values in table four can be compared to the to the 
RESET test made on only unlogged variables.  This test indicated a non-linear relationship, 
which further implies that some variables should be logged.  
 
Table 5. RESET test. 
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F-statistic 0.8968     Prob. F(44.676) 0.6635
Obs*R-squared 39.76478     Prob. Chi-Square(44) 0.6536
Scaled explained SS 159.9669     Prob. Chi-Square(44) 0
Heteroscedasticity test 
According to the table 5, presenting the outcome of a White test, the F-stat probability of 
0.664 indicates that the null-hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be rejected. Hence, there 
is no sign of heteroscedasticity with in the data that has to be controlled for.  
Table 6. White test 
 
 
 
Autocorrelation 
According to table 7 the Durbin-Watson stat is 1.53 and indicating a weak positive 
autocorrelation. Since the value is considered to be close to the critical value of 1.57, 
indicating no evidence of autocorrelation, no adjustments are made and the assumption of no 
autocorrelation is assumed to hold further in the regression.  
 
Endogeneity  
When testing the relevance of “Total Assets” as an IV it shows significant values on a 1 % 
level for all four variables “Cash to Assets”, “Book to Market”, Market Value and “ROA”. 
Hence, “Total Assets” is significantly valid to use as an instrumental variable in order to test 
for endogenous variables. The retrieved fitted values for the four potential endogenous 
variables, “Cash to Assets”, “Book to Market”, Market Value and “ROA” are only 
significant for “Book to Market”. Thus, “Book to Market” is the only variable that is 
statistically endogenous with a probability value of 0.006. Running a regression using the 
Two Stage Least Square method (TSLS) with “Total Asset” as the IV the regression will 
account for the endogeneity issue.   
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Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Test cross-section and period fixed effects
Effects Test Statistic  d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 2.148859 -69.633 0
Cross-section Chi-square 151.735922 69 0
Period F 4.427768 -10.633 0
Period Chi-square 48.747484 10 0
Cross-Section/Period F 2.439488 -79.633 0
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 191.630786 79 0
Heterogeneity  
In order to test for heterogeneity the regression is performed using fixed effects in both the 
cross sectional and time dimension and then a redundant test is performed. The results are 
presented below:  
Table 7. Redundant test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The F-stat and Chi-square are highly significant for both the cross sectional and the time 
dimension. Hence, is the null-hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected for both cross section 
and period. The statistically significant heterogeneity limits the regression to be determined 
with either fixed or random effect since a standard pooled regression does not account for 
heterogeneity. 
If random effect is well specified the model is generally more effective than fixed effect 
model in controlling for heterogeneity. Due to the fact there is heterogeneity in both 
dimensions and that e-views does not offers the ability to test for random effects in cross 
section and time dimension simultaneous is this done manually, using within transformation. 
Within transformation is used in order to conclude whether random or fixed effects is more 
efficient.  
The Hausman tests fails with the random effect specification in both dimensions which 
indicates that it is unable to determine if the random effect is efficient, see exhibit 5 and 6. 
Since fixed effects is consistent under both hypothesis, the fixed effects model is chosen in 
both dimensions in order to control for heterogeneity. Hence, the higher efficiency if the null-
hypothesis holds is ignored.  
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4.2 Interpretation of Regression Coefficients 
Since both the dependent variable and some of the independent variables are log-transformed, 
one have to use both the log-linear and log-log methodology in order to interpret the results.  
The log-linear model is used to interpret unlogged independent variables in relation to a 
logged dependent variable. To capture the unlogged effect of changes in X on Y one have to 
multiply the expected value of Y by 𝑒𝛽. Hence, one-unit change in X will affect Y by 𝑒𝛽.  
The log-log model is used to interpret logged independent variables in relation to a logged 
dependent variable. This type relationship is commonly referred to as an elastic relationship. 
The interpretation of the coefficients is the same as in an unlogged model. Hence, one-unit 
change in X will cause an effect in Y equal to the coefficient.  
Table 8. TSLS Regression Result 
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The above table displays the result of our regression. Three of the independent variables, 
institutional ownership, dividend yield and ROA are unlogged. In order to interpret these 
variables each unit increase in Xi has to be multiplied by 𝑒𝛽 . The coefficients of these three 
variables will adopt the following values: 
 
Institutional ownership:  𝑒3.461 = 31.849 
Dividend yield:  𝑒−35.284 = 4.746𝐸 ̵16 
ROA:  𝑒0.0443 = 1.045 
The coefficient related to institutional ownership adopts a value of 31.848. This means that a 
one percentage increase in institutional ownership would cause an increase in repurchase 
amount by 31.849 %. Since the repurchase amount is stated as a ratio of the total shares 
outstanding it is important to stress that the increase of 31.849 % is a relative increase and not 
an absolute increase. The dividend yield coefficient adopts a negative value of 4.746E-16. 
Since the coefficient adopts such a small value it can be concluded that this variable have 
very limited impact in the dependent variable. ROA takes on a value of 1.045. Hence a 
percentage increase in ROA would have a positive effect on repurchase amount by 1.045%. 
However, neither of the coefficients are significant at the 5% significance level.  
The interpretation of the logged variables is as follows. The management ownership 
coefficient is -0.232. Thus, a one-unit increase in managerial ownership would affect the 
repurchase ratio by -0.232 %. The debt to capital coefficient takes on a value of 1.469. 
Consequently an increase in the amount of debt relative to total capital would increase the 
repurchase amount ratio by 1.469 %. The cash to total asset coefficient is -0.599. Hence, an 
increase in cash in relation to total asset would negatively affect the dependent variable by 
0.599 %. Both the book to market coefficient and the market value coefficient takes on quite 
large values in relations to the other coefficients. The values of these coefficients are -15.285 
and -8.973 respectively. Thus, an increase in either book to market or market value would 
have a negative impact in the repurchase amount by 15.285 and 8.973 percentages 
respectively.  
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5 Analysis  
The following section comprises a discussion of the empirical results in relation to the theory 
and previous findings. Possible reasons for why the results in this study differs from what the 
theory and previous findings will be outlined.  
5.1 Institutional ownership 
According to the regression result in table 6, the institutional ownership shows no significant 
impact on share repurchases. Even though the variable lack significance it can be argued that 
there is indication of large influence by institutions to what extent firms repurchase shares. 
The coefficient implies a 31.8 unit increase in repurchase amount when the institutional 
ownership increase by one-unit, and is thus the variable that indicates the largest impact on 
share repurchase. The high influence of institutions confirms Allen et. al. (2000) theory of 
concentrated ownerships ability to exercise control over managers. These results are also 
consistent with Bartov et. al. (1998) and Ross et al. (2005), who explains the positive 
relationship with institutional investors’ tax-preference. Both in the US and in most European 
countries institutional investors prefer share repurchase to dividends. The favourable taxation 
of capital gains compare to dividend is applicable for Swedish institutions as well (39 kap. 
14§ IL), since capital gains are tax-exempt while dividends are not. This further agues for a 
positive coefficient value. However, some of the institutional investors in the sample might 
be from other countries where different tax regulations are applied. Hence, it is hard to 
conclude that the tax motive is valid for all institutions included in the sample. The positive 
coefficient of institutional ownership contradicts Jensens (1986) view of reduced need of 
share repurchase when there is a concentrated ownership. Nevertheless the contradiction of 
Jensen´s argumentation cannot be significantly determined. But the coefficient strongly 
indicates that the tax effects of a share repurchase is of greater value for institutions than the 
monitoring effect of share repurchase.  
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5.2 Managerial ownership 
 
Previous research argues that high managerial exposure to the firm’s market value, in terms 
of shares, options etc., works as a strong incentive for managers to engage in share 
repurchase since this tends to put an upward pressure on the share price (Fenn and Liang, 
2000), hence a positive relationship is expected. In contrast, this study indicates a reversed 
relationship with a coefficient of -0.25, also there is a substantially lack of significance which 
makes is hard to make any general assumptions. The low significance and coefficient value 
can be a result of the fact that only actual shares owned by the management are accounted 
for. Hence are stock options and other adequate instruments used as incentives ignored in this 
study. It is most reasonable to believe that stock options etc. accounts for a considerable 
amount of managers total incentive program. Further it can be argued that firms with high 
levels of concentrated ownership are subject to a higher degree of monitoring. A study by 
Lekvall (2009) states that Sweden is categorized by relatively high concentration of 
ownership, hence manager’s ability to engage in self-beneficial activities are reduced. 
Management ability to repurchase share in order to increase the value of their own stock 
options is therefore limited.  
5.3 Cash 
This study shows a small negative relation between the company’s cash holding, expressed in 
percentage of total assets, and shares repurchased. The regression result is significant on a 10 
% level and can therefore be considered weak when making general assumptions. The fact 
that coefficient adopts a negative value contradicts the intuitive argument. Theories within 
this area are seemingly consistent that a large amount of excess cash is positively related to 
share repurchase. The positive relationship is described by the fact that share repurchase can 
be used to mitigate agency cost of free cash flow (Easterbrook, 1984) (Jensen, 1986). In order 
to find a reasonable explanation to the negative relation the three main reasons for share 
repurchase are considered. Firstly, a way for management to bridge the information 
asymmetry through signals to the market. A negative relation could in that case indicate that 
firms use “fake” signals to a higher extent than earlier research shows. Generally are these 
signals costly both in terms of cash outflow but also in terms of decreased ability to engage in 
future investments.  
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Secondly, mitigating agency cost of free cash flow and restrict managers to invest in negative 
NPV projects.  
As discussed earlier is Sweden characterized by concentrated ownership which could imply 
high degree of monitoring. Hence, the overinvestment problem is already controlled for. 
Lastly, repurchase is a way of tuning the company’s capital structure. If the amount of cash 
holding is not a significant source of repurchase then it could indicate that firms instead are 
using debt to finance the share repurchase. By using debt to repurchase shares the debt 
relative to capital increases.  
5.4 ROA 
As can be seen in the result of the regression the ROA coefficient adopts a positive value of 
1.05, meaning that when the ROA variable increases by one percentage the repurchase 
amount will increase by 1.05 %. The intuition regarding this variable is that the relationship 
would be negative. As the ROA goes down management can execute a share repurchase and 
by doing so increase the profitability measure again. The reason why this coefficient is 
positive could be explained by the fact that the asset base is actually reduced when a share 
repurchase is executed. Another possible explanation to this is that, when excess cash is 
reduced the overinvestment problem becomes less severe. Ultimately this leads to fewer 
investments in non-value crating projects and an increase in ROA. However, the coefficient 
is not significant and it is therefore hard to draw any definite conclusions.  
5.5 Debt to capital 
It is argued that each firm has an optimal capital structure and that share repurchase can be an 
effective tool to tune the capital structure in an optimal way. Jung et al. (1996) argues that the 
agency costs associated with managerial discretion is a decreasing function of leverage while 
the agency cost of debt is an increasing function of debt. The optimal capital structure is 
when these two effects are offsetting each other. The debt to capital coefficient takes on a 
value of 1.57 and it is significant at a 5 % significance level. Since each individual firm has 
its own optimal capital structure it is hard to draw any conclusion whether firms initiate a 
share repurchase to reach this level or not.  
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However, one can see that the debt to capital level has a significant positive impact on share 
repurchase amount. One possible explanation to this relationship is that the repurchases are 
financed with debt.  
If management want to increase the level of debt without having any projects to invest in, an 
option could be to borrow money and distribute these to the shareholders via a share 
repurchase. By doing so, management would both signal undervaluation and reach a better 
capital structure. This way of signalling undervaluation would also be very costly to mimic, 
hence it would be a very strong signal to the market.  
5.6 Dividend yield 
The dividend yield variable is one of the unlogged variables hence in order to retrieve the true 
value of the coefficient it is recalculated. The value of the dividend yield coefficient is 4.75E-
16 and significant at a 10 % level. The impact on share repurchase can therefore be seen as 
very limited. According to previous research (Fenn and Liang, 2000) share repurchase is 
commonly used as a complement or even a substitute to dividends. Allen et al. (2000) also 
find that, in comparison to dividends, the popularity of share repurchases has increased 
substantially. The very limited impact of this variable on the dependent variable would point 
in a direction were the share repurchase is used as a compliment rather than substitute to 
dividends. However, this conclusion is hard to make since the relation between institutional 
investors, who face tax advantage on capital gain in relation to dividend, is not examined in 
this study. 
 
5.7 Book to market  
The book to market coefficient is negative (-16.31) and significant at a 5 % level. The 
interpretation of the impact of this variable on share repurchase is, when the book to market 
ratio increase by one unit the share repurchase amount will decrease by 16.31 units. Since the 
book to market value is an indicator whether the stock is undervalued or not, this variable 
should intuitively have an impact on a firms’ decision to repurchase their own shares. This is 
due because the initiation of a share repurchase can be seen as a signal of undervaluation 
(Ikenberry et al. 1995). 
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 Hence, firms with low book to market value would be more likely to undertake a share 
repurchase program in order to adjust the stock price. The results in this study points in a 
direction that support their argumentation. As the book to market value increases firms tend 
to execute less share repurchases.  
This is also in line with previous research (Brav et al. 2005) who finds empirical evidence 
that firms initiate share repurchases when the stock is considered undervalued. The book to 
market coefficient is significant and takes on a value of -16.31 which is relatively large 
compare to the other coefficients in the regression. Thus, it can be concluded that the value of 
the firm is a decisive factor when firms chose to execute a share repurchase.  
5.8 Market value 
The market value coefficient is negative (-9.56) and significant at a 5 % level. The negative 
impact on share repurchase indicates that as the market value, as a proxy for firm size, 
increase the less amount of shares are the firms repurchasing. According to the theory, market 
value will affect the level of information asymmetry between the firm and the market. The 
level of monitoring is usually better for larger firms. Hence, the information asymmetry 
problem is less severe for larger firm. This would imply that, in order to overcome the agency 
costs related to information asymmetry, larger firms would not use share repurchase to the 
same extent as smaller firms. Which the results in this study also indicates. Since the market 
value coefficient is negative, this would imply that as the firm is growing, in terms of market 
value, the share repurchase amount decreases. The fact that this study only investigates share 
repurchases made by firms on the NASDAQ OMX Large Cap put some limitations on the 
coefficient. Since the investigated firms are relatively equal in size the coefficient could have 
taken on a different, potentially larger value, if firms listed at other minor lists were 
incorporated in the study. Nevertheless, the coefficient is in fact significant at a 5% level and 
the impact is negative which support the argumentation made above.  
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6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the research questions are answered and a final conclusion regarding the 
empirical results is outlined. Furthermore, a proposal for future research is presented.  
The main purpose of this study is to examine to what extent different factors are affecting a 
firms decision regarding share repurchase by answering the following questions: “Is there any 
relationship between managerial- and institutional ownership and Swedish companies share 
repurchase policies?”, “Based on traditional finance theories and previous research, what 
other variables may effect a company’s decision to initiate a share repurchase?” and “What 
could possibly explain a potential relationship?” 
 
The findings in this study indicate that the ownership structure strongly influences the firms’ 
decision of share repurchase policy. The managerial ownership shows a small negative 
relationship to share repurchase and is therefore indicating a reversed relationship compared 
to most of the previous findings. Since the significance is quite low no greater importance is 
attached to this variable. However, the main factor that seems to determine the amount of 
shares being repurchased is the size of the total institutional ownership. It is already 
concluded that the Swedish market is characterized by concentrated ownership, which most 
likely can explain the high impact of institutions. Not only is the institutional ownership 
indicating strong relationship to share repurchase it is also the variable presenting the highest 
coefficient value. Hence, representing the most essential factor in the study. Considering the 
positive relationship it can be argued that institutions seem to use their power to benefit on 
favourable taxation. The fact that managerial ownership has very low impact on share 
repurchase and that institutional ownership has a relatively high impact on share repurchase 
could also be explained by the characteristics of the Swedish governance system. Which has 
a strong focus to align the interest between managers and institutional owners. 
 
Based on the result of this study it can be concluded that the variables that have a significant 
impact on the share repurchase amount is the book to market variable and the market value 
variable. Both these variables adopt a negative coefficient value, which is in line with 
previous findings and confirms the intuitive argumentation in this study. The negative 
relationship between book to market and share repurchase could be explained by the 
signalling hypothesis.  
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Further, this relationship implies that managers seem to believe that share repurchase is an 
effective tool to communicate an undervaluation of the firm. Whereas the negative 
relationship between market value and share repurchase could be explained by the fact that 
lager firms tend to be more highly monitored and therefor face a less sever information 
asymmetry problem. These firms are therefore in less need of using share repurchases as a 
way to bridge an information gap. None of the other variables shows any significant 
relationship to share repurchase, hence no general conclusions can be made regarding these 
variables. 
 
Finally it can be concluded that the factors that seems to be influential on the share 
repurchase decision making are institutional ownership, book to market and market value. 
6.1 Proposal for further research  
This study is mainly focusing on the relationship between share repurchase and the 
institutional and managerial ownership. It is concluded that that there is no significant 
relationship between managerial ownership and share repurchases. Moreover, the 
insignificant managerial ownership coefficient is negative, which indicates an opposite 
relationship compare to theories and previous studies. Since this study does not include 
management’s stock option holdings the significance and the value of the coefficient could be 
questioned. Therefore, one suggestion for further research is to include the management stock 
option holding and by doing so improve the validity of the managerial ownership coefficient.  
Furthermore, this study only includes companies listed on the Stockholm OMX Large Cap 
list. By including companies listed at other, minor lists, one could possibly make other 
conclusions regarding the information asymmetry in small versus large firms and the use of 
share repurchases. Hence, a research on the same topic with a wider sample would be of 
interest.   
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Value df Probability
t-statistic 4.508031 711 0
F-statistic 20.32234 (1. 711) 0
Likelihood ratio 20.31915 1 0
8 Appendix   
8.1 Exhibit 1. Descriptive statistics for unlogged variables. 
 
 
 
8.2 Exhibit 2. RESET test unlogged values. 
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8.3 Exhibit 3. Testing validity of IV. 
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Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 13.630619 8 0.0919
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test period random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Period random 11.463530 8 0.1768
8.4 Exhibit 4. Testing if “Book to Market” is exogenous. 
 
8.5 Exhibit 5. Hausman test, Cross-section. 
 
 
 
8.6 Exhibit 6. Hausman test, Period dimension. 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 0.000000 7 1.0000
* Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero.
** WARNING: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero.
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test period random effects
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Period random 0.000000 7 1.0000
* Period test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero.
** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero.
 
8.7 Exhibit 7. Hausman test, Cross-section,, using within 
transformation.  
 
 
 
 
8.8 Exhibit 8. Hausman test, Period dimension, using within 
transformation. 
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AAK Kinnevik
ABB Latour
Africa Oil Corp. Loomis
Alfa Laval Lundberg
AAK Lundin Mining Corporation SDB
ABB Lundin Petroleum
Africa Oil Corp. Meda
Alfa Laval Melker Schörling
Autoliv SDB Millicom International Cellular SDB
Axfood MTG
Axis NCC
Fastigheter Balder Nibe Industrier
Betsson Nobia
BillerudKorsnäs Nordea Bank
Boliden Oriflame Cosmetics SDB
Castellum Peab
Electrolux Ratos
Elekta SAAB
EnQuest PLC Sandvik
Ericsson SCA
Fabege SEB
Getinge Securitas
H&M Skanska
Handelsbanken SKF
Hexagon SSAB
Hexpol Stora Enso
Holmen Swedbank
Hufvudstaden Swedish Match
Husqvarna Swedish Orphan Biovitrum
ICA Gruppen Tele2
Industrivärden TeliaSonera
Indutrade Tieto
Intrum Justitia Trelleborg
Investor Wallenstam
JM Volvo
8.9 Exhibit 9. Companies included in the sample. 
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Com Hem Holding
Lifco 
8.10 Exhibit 10. Companies listed on NASDAQ OMX Large Cap not 
included in the sample. 
 
 
